Like I said, I believe the "problem" itself is ill-defined. Philosophy in general has a tendency to devolve into arguments over word definitions and I simply don't think that's productive. A simulation of the brain will give us the data we need to frame the problem precisely enough to actually answer it.
> If we find something that doesn't obey the laws of current physics, we just modify the laws.
If consciousness is truly outside the domain of science then logically there would be no law we could create to account for its effects. But I'll go a step further and say that I believe consciousness obeys the laws of physics as we currently understand them. Again I don't have a proof of this, but neither do the people who say it doesn't.
>Like I said, I believe the "problem" itself is ill-defined.
You keep saying that, but you neither specify which problem you are referring to, or in which respect you believe it to be ill-defined. So it's kind of hard to respond to a vague assertion of that sort. It's ironic that you of all people should be accusing philosophers of using language imprecisely.
>But I'll go a step further and say that I believe consciousness obeys the laws of physics as we currently understand them.
Again: what is your reason for believing this? It is not enough just to assert it. Also, you are forgetting the logical possibility that consciousness is compatible with the laws of current physics but not actually explained by them. (In the same way that, for example, the truth of the equation "2 + 2 = 4" is compatible with the truth of Newton's second law, but not explained by it because they are statements in different domains.)
The problem was stated by christopherolah, and labeled as such. I'll quote it here for your convenience:
"The problem is this: Consider perceiving the color red. An outside observer can explain this as photons hitting my eye and me reacting. The only problem is, I can actually see the color. How can a series of chemical reactions cause me to feel?"
As I have said, the respect in which it is ill-defined is the imprecise definitions of the words used. An argument about this will eventually turn to haggling over the definitions of words like "see", "perceive", and especially "feel".
"what is your reason for believing [consciousness obeys physics]?"
I don't claim to have a strong argument. This thread is already too long so I'm not going to list my reasons, but the point I'd like to make is that the opposing view doesn't have strong arguments either, and I feel the burden of proof rests more heavily on that side, considering Occam's razor.
>As I have said, the respect in which it is ill-defined is the imprecise definitions of the words used.
I don't see any lack of precision. We all know what it is like to see red, or to feel elated. The definitions of these words don't really seem to be relevant to the debate. At least in the philosophical literature on this stuff, questions of definition haven't arisen very often in the arguments between opposing camps.
>[consciousness obeys physics]
Well, to be precise, I also believe that consciousness "obeys" physics, I just don't think that the laws of physics explain or imply the existence of consciousness.
>and I feel the burden of proof rests more heavily on that side, considering Occam's razor.
Occam's razor is a device for choosing between explanations, but physicalism currently has no explanation of consciousness, so Occam's razor is inapplicable. Admittedly, none of the alternatives to physicalism give a deep or satisfying explanation for the existence of consciousness, but even a shallow explanation for the most immediate fact about our reality is better than none.
> If we find something that doesn't obey the laws of current physics, we just modify the laws.
If consciousness is truly outside the domain of science then logically there would be no law we could create to account for its effects. But I'll go a step further and say that I believe consciousness obeys the laws of physics as we currently understand them. Again I don't have a proof of this, but neither do the people who say it doesn't.