> Strong regulation and legal consequences could potentially fix this.
There are regulations. E.g., in the US, 17 CFR § 40.11 prohibits contracts on "terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or an activity that is unlawful under any State or Federal law" [0]. The problem is that those responsible for enforcing those regulations are currently uninterested in doing so [1].
Yeah, regulations are only as strong as the consequences given those who break them.
If people can threaten journalists for money and get away with it, they will. If people who threaten journalists over money are sent to prison, then after a brief transition period it will mostly stop.
It's braindead easy to anonymously threaten people on the internet. It's getting easier to steal identities or create new ones out of whole cloth and cypto wallets means you can't functionally know where the money comes from. I'm not sure attempting to punish people you can't realistically identify can be considered an effective strategy.
Punishing a corporate entity however is much easier.
During WW2 when Britain captured all incoming german spies and ran a fake german spy network, they could redirect the german V1 or V2 bombs, by misreporting what they did or didn't hit.
Allowing bets on acts of violence allows the perpetrators to assess their success rate...
They do. It's moot, though, because Polymarket isn't subject to US law.
There has been an ongoing controversy over the fact that Kalshi (which is subject to US law) chose to comply with the law over the market on Khomeini "leaving office", when the bettors assumed that it wouldn't.
Well that is a high enough level even the bet would probably be enforced. But the point is valid, this is a slippery slope and there's a reason these bets are illegal.
There are regulations. E.g., in the US, 17 CFR § 40.11 prohibits contracts on "terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or an activity that is unlawful under any State or Federal law" [0]. The problem is that those responsible for enforcing those regulations are currently uninterested in doing so [1].
[0] https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/40.11
[1] https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/9183-26